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Part IV: United States Navy - The Interwar Years By
Alan Raven (Article reprinted courtesy of Plastic Ship Modeler Magazine issue #97/2) expected
to play in future campaigns may tip the scale in favor of this measure.
Normally, Jap flares would he dropped behind our vessels to silhouette
them. A recent combat report stated that one of our ships altered her course 30
degrees in order to bring the flares to the "engaged side" - whereupon
enemy fire slackened. If it is to
he a standard maneuver, the rather light colors of Measure 32A might be
objectionable, unless the confusion created by pattern made up for it.
Flares dropped beside the U.S.S. BUNKFR HILL, on the night of
8/26/44 were not very effective down light and this observer was not able
to pick up any of our accompanying ships in that direction. The Japs are
credited with having better pyrotechnics than we have. 8.
Our proposed measure 33A is too light to be satisfactory if seen against a
foliage background but we believe that to the enemy on shore observing ships
against sky or water it would prove the best round the clock, twenty four hour
camouflage for those who think they need low visibility more than deception. 9.
Light Gray paint (5-L) has been under study for more than two months by this
observer and its excellent low visibility characteristics have been
demonstrated. It is especially good
just before sunrise, after sundown, and at night. Even down moon it is fair unless the moon is low and very
dull. During combat practice at sea
on the U.S.S. BUNKER HILL, the U.S.S. INTREPID was carefully studied at a range
of 2500 yards. The moon on that
night (8/25/44) was just short of being half full and the altitude was estimated
to be about 50 degrees. There was a
faint overcast of light cloud part of the time.
With 7.5 binoculars the pattern came out quite strongly, enough to
produce a certain amount of deception. But
to the trained eye it was not the light areas but the black paint areas that
rendered it visible. 10.
The Light Gray (5-L) was almost a perfect match for the water, and if visibility
reduction were your sole aim the INTREPID could have been turned into a ghost
ship at 5000 yards by removing the black paint. In the Central Pacific, visibility conditions are completely
different from those in the Atlantic owing to the constant cloud cover and its
reflection on the sea. From the air
these same cloud reflections are present and many more ships are seen because
they are too dark than because they are too light. Measure 21 ships are better suited to the Atlantic than the
Central Pacific where they are an anachronism which survives, because the
visibility of ships has not received adequate study. 11.
Light Gray has been proposed as the fundamental color for Measure 33A because
much night action is now anticipated and this color is effective during the only
part of the 24 hours when reduced visibility has any chance.
During broad daylight in the Central Pacific concealment of a large
vessel is just wishful thinking. At
such time paint has nothing to offer a ship but deception. 12.
Of course a price has to he paid for all low visibility paints.
Light Gray is very conspicuous when seen down sun against the water at
close range and it is pretty terrible when the first rays of the rising sun
strike it and make it conspicuous even at distant ranges. 13.
Before leaving the subject of cruiser painting it may be of interest to point
out that in the poll, which we took among officers to ascertain which was
regarded as "Public Enemy No. 1", the cruisers did not put submarine
attack in a high place. Snoopers
and torpedo planes were tied for first place. DESTROYERS
14.
The destroyers are also expecting that 50% of future operations will he
amphibious, and their reaction is quite opposed to that of the cruiser group. "Concealment
went out with the advent of radar. We
need confusion against shore batteries, and we want the maximum amount of
confusion in an attack - confusion to start from 20,000 yards down to 5000
yards" - Capt. R. N. Smoot, USN, ComDesPac (interview on U.S.S. CASCADE
8/22/44). 15.
The destroyers like the camouflage they have and at a meeting called by Capt.
Smoot the endorsement was almost unanimous. "All
we ask of camouflage is target deception" - Capt. F. Chillingworth, USN,
ComDesRon 50. ComDesRons
6, 52, and 53 were not present but sent representatives who endorsed the
existing program. Capt. Carlton R.
Todd, USN, ComDesRon 5, wrote a letter to ComServPac saying, "the choice of
so- called dazzle patterns is sound".
Interviewed on the U.S.S. PORTERFIELD, DD682, on 8/19/44, he said more
vigorously and colloquially "confusing as hell, especially the CVE's". 16.
The only important dissent that we have had so far comes from ComDesRon 47
(letter to ComServPac 8/18/44) "It
is believed that the manner in which a combat ship is painted has little if any
effect upon the ease with which it may he sighted or with which its type, course
and speed may be ascertained". 17.
An analysis of the 19 signed papers at the meeting on the U.S.S. CASCADE
revealed some interesting data. All
(19) of the officers present went on record that pattern camouflage created
deception of target angle. 18 voted
that it created type deception and retarded recognition.
8 officers said that patterns decreased visibility, 4 said that it
increased it, and the rest voted no difference - sometimes increase and
sometimes decrease. These last were
on the soundest ground. We have
much testimony that visibility is decreased at far ranges, but it is obvious
that deception patterns must be conspicuous at near or intermediate ranges or
there would he no deception. 18.
In the vote for the enemy's most dangerous weapon there were 9 votes for torpedo
aircraft, 6 for surface craft and only 3 for submarines.
A few scattered votes for snoopers for second place were recorded but
dive bombers were not even mentioned. 19.
In view of the strong endorsement which existing measure have received from the
DD's I am disinclined to recommend any extensive change though I have noticed
individual designs that might and should he improved. There is one exception. I recommend that thc deck patterns be
discontinued for all DD's and DE's and that the Bureau issue a directive
requesting that at the next repainting these decks he painted in a single
uniform shade, either Deck Blue (20-B) or Black (24-B).
So far I have yet to see a deck pattern that was visible from the air,
and it is hard to find it when you are standing right on the deck.
Capt. Ralph Earl, USN, Operations Officer for ComDesPac, said in an
interview that he believed deck patterns useless on destroyers. 20.
Eventually deck patterns on BB's and CL's will probably have to go and this
should be taken care of in the revisions which will be made in the painting of
these types of vessels. Maintenance
is such an acute problem here that any burden placed upon it must justify itself
through proven utility or effectiveness.
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